Dictators like Saddam survive by making sure that nobody knows much, and that’s particularly true for diplomats: The very nature of their jobs, living and working among foreigners, makes them suspect. So it’s not surprising that the news last week that two Iraqi diplomats at the United Nations had sought asylum in the United States was greeted without fanfare-and with none of the usual cliches about “an intelligence bonanza.” What could two mid-level diplomats in New York reveal about the ultra-secretive inner workings of Baghdad?
Probably not much. But Mohammed al-Humaimidi and Fela Hesan al-Rubaie could possibly tarnish the new romance between President Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin. How? By dropping tidbits about shady dealings long suspected to have occurred between Moscow and Baghdad. Even as the defections of Iraq’s No. 2 and No. 4 diplomats at the U.N. became known, Russia successfully used its threat of a veto in the U.N. Security Council to thwart a U.S. and British initiative to overhaul the sanctions regime against Iraq. The new policy would have imposed “smart sanctions” on Iraq-focused tightly on preventing Baghdad from acquiring “dual use” goods that can be used for military purposes-while relaxing other commercial dealings. Iraq was dead set against the new approach, and Russia came to its rescue, standing alone against 14 other Security Council members. Iraq’s U.N. defectors might have been privy to at least some of the correspondence on what, specifically, Iraq was offering Moscow in return for its help. “While Baghdad might be sweating over the defections,” says Richard Butler, the former head of the U.N. inspection effort in Iraq, “there might be a few drops of sweat in… Moscow as well.”
Russia has clear economic incentives for breaking with the pack. Even under the current restrictions of the oil-for-food program, Russia’s trade with Iraq last year totaled $2.4 billion. “In Baghdad they tell us: ‘If you’re for sanctions, you’ll lose all your business in Iraq,’” says Aleksei Mitrofanov, a member of the foreign-policy committee of the State Duma. And the Iraqis have promised to sweeten the take for Russian companies if sanctions are lifted. When Russian officials were in Baghdad last week, Iraqi Vice President Tariq Aziz bluntly stated that “a correct policy will bring economic benefits,” according to the daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta.
Putin also has political reasons to tilt toward Iraq. In Moscow, support for Saddam has always been a way for politicians to demonstrate their independence from the West. Ultra-nationalist Vladamir Zhirinovsky has long been the loudest Saddam fan in Russia. Yet as Russia grapples with a serious post-cold-war inferiority complex, Zhirinovsky is part of a large and growing chorus. Before the U.N. vote came to a head, the Duma passed a resolution-by a whopping 242-3 vote-urging Putin to oppose any sanctions at all against Iraq.
The Bush administration has tried to persuade Putin otherwise, of course. Only last month, Bush met with Putin and declared that he had gotten “a sense of his soul” and found the former KGB colonel “trustworthy.” And Secretary of State Colin Powell, the key proponent of the smart-sanctions policy within the Bush administration, has lobbied his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov.
“Frankly it’s kind of hard to figure them out,” said a senior administration official late last week, adding that Bush would talk to Putin again on the subject with they meet in Genoa later this month.
In private debriefing rooms, the two Iraqi defectors-one of whom is rumored to be an intelligence agent-may help to unravel the particulars of Iraq’s sanctions strategy. What they will not likely do is publicly embarrass Saddam. Although both men sought asylum with their wives and children, both still have other relatives back home. And if Saddam cannot punish an enemy directly, he and his henchmen will often settle for a brother, sister, or cousin. “These two diplomats have to assume that members of their extended family have been arrested by now, interrogated, maybe worse,” says Hania Mufti, who follows Iraq for Human Rights Watch. “That’s part of the price you pay.” It’s also why more Iraqis don’t bolt, and why American intelligence on Baghdad is so poor.
