The question won’t go begging for long. Under pressure by members of his own administration, Capitol Hill and an American public dismayed by TV’s ghastly parade of Bosnian victims, Clinton is rethinking U.S. policy in the Balkans. A new plan could come as early as this week-perhaps an ultimatum to the Serbs to silence their guns or face military reprisal, or even a pre-emptive strike on a Serbian target. “The option of doing nothing has been rejected,” says a top Clinton adviser. “The question now is what, not if.” At a press conference late last week, the president acknowledged that airstrikes against the Serbs or a lifting of the arms embargo against the Bosnians were under “serious consideration.” But administration and diplomatic sources have informed NEWSWEEK that such options are part of a larger strategy with two distinct goals: a cease-fire and a political resolution of the conflict. Says one source: “Our overriding priority is to stop the killings.”
The new approach is a hybrid: neither a complete rejection of diplomacy nor a commitment to full-scale intervention. “We aren’t going to go in to try to win the war for the Bosnians,” insists a senior administration official. “We’re trying to drive the parties to a political settlement.” The VanceOwen plan, the Clinton team has decided, is dead in anything like its present form. That effort, which preserved the boundaries of Bosnia by slicing the republic into 10 autonomous ethnic provinces, attempted the impossible-a de facto cease-fire that followed from an agreed-upon political solution. It never worked, because the Bosnian Serbs refused to sign on to a map requiring them to give back some 30 percent of the land they’ve seized. While the administration still aims to stop Serbian aggression, it has separated the issue of a cease-fire from a reversal of Serb territorial gains.
Even a partial rollback might require a huge presence of U.S. ground troops-an unacceptably high political risk to Clinton. Americans may be appalled by the carnage, but they are also terrified of a quagmire. (A NEWSWEEK Poll shows how deeply divided opinion is over U.S. involvement in Bosnia.) To avoid a commitment that might lead to escalation, the administration has also chosen not to declare war on Serbia. “The United States is not, should not become involved as a partisan,” Clinton told reporters. Propping up Bosnia could turn it into a client state-“just like the Republic of Vietnam,” says one insider-whose fate would depend almost entirely on U.S. actions. The administration is also resolved to act in concert with the international community and prior United Nations resolutions to avoid putting Russian President Boris Yeltsin on the spot. Lifting the arms embargo requires a new vote; airstrikes do not.
As they sought to balance fears at home with imperatives abroad, the Clinton team sifted through a range of interlocking options that could include:
A U.S.-led, multinational initiative calling for an immediate cease-fire on humanitarian grounds and, perhaps, a partial withdrawal of Serb forces.
A U.N. effort to revive the peace process and, perhaps, a plan that would likely involve exchanges of both territories and populations between warring factions.
A series of Security Council actions, modeled on its recent initiative in Srebrenica, declaring beleaguered Bosnian communities “safe areas” under U.N. protection.
Threatened or renewed U.S. airstrikes against any party breaching the cease-fire, a move arguably covered by an existing Security Council resolution authorizing “all necessary measures” to safeguard humanitarian assistance.
Refining these options took hours of consultation with U.S. allies and lively discussion among Clinton advisers. Some of those deep divisions had gone public in a leak to The New York Times. Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, sent a memo to Clinton urging airstrikes. “We should not turn our backs on our international responsibilities,” she wrote. In a letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 12 Foreign Service officers slammed the West’s diplomatic efforts as “capitulation to Serbian aggression” and called for military force. Within the Oval Office, two distinct threads emerged. Christopher was willing to try to arm the Muslims but wasn’t convinced that limited airstrikes would be useful. A more hawkish group-Defense Secretary Les Aspin, Albright, national-security adviser Anthony Lake and his deputy Samuel Berger-favored airstrikes, arguing that arming the Muslims without strikes would only encourage the Serbs to speed up their offensive. Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, warned of the dangers of military action without clear aims and near certainty of success. Clinton, sitting in his wing chair, steered the conversation back to essentials. “What are the objectives here?” he’d ask. “What are our limitations?” No one could give him entirely satisfactory answers. In fact, most admitted to changing their minds more than once.
The White House debate focused on twin objectives-an immediate cease-fire and a longer-term political settlement. The vexing question was how to get the Serbs to stop shooting. The choices, says an insider, broke down into “inducement” or “compellance.” Some officials felt that a cease-fire " in place"-leaving Serbs in control of much of eastern and northwestern Bosnia-would itself be sufficient incentive. If force were necessary, airstrikes would work best. Arming the Bosnians posed logistical problems of delivery and, probably, training. Bombing had its drawbacks, as well. Who would supply the small contingent of ground forces trained to spot incoming artillery fire, locate the source and call in the airstrike? Could batteries hidden in civilian communities be hit? As for targets, some officials argued that hitting bridges or power lines in Serbia might encourage Serbian escalation. Far better to apply force directly and swiftly-obliterating, say, a battery that had opened fire.
As discussion raged within the Oval Office, the war in Bosnia widened. Savage fighting erupted between Muslims and Croats, nominal allies against the Serbs, in towns to the west of Sarajevo, killing at least 250 people, mostly civilians. Although both sides have been charged with atrocities, U.N. forces have blamed most of the ethnic cleansing on the Croats. British troops reported seeing hundreds of dead in the central Bosnian town of Vitez, where drunken Croat militia destroyed mosques and went house to house lobbing in hand grenades to drive out local residents. At the weekend, Lord Owen, the European Community envoy, brokered a truce between the factions that called an immediate halt to the clashes in central Bosnia.
Belgrade hunkered down for war with the West. As civilians prepared for a new round of tightened sanctions, municipal officials issued a little-heeded warning that air-raid shelters should be cleared. Lord Owen met with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and offered a final concession-a demilitarized corridor that would link Serb-held territories in Bosnia. Still, Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, wasn’t having any: “If we accept this, we’re dead.” Washington’s goal now is to make him wish he had taken the deal.
Do you agree or disagree that the fighting in Bosnia is not America’s problem?
47% Agree 47% Disagree
Do you favor or oppose having U.S. military planes attack Serbian artillery, military positions and supply lines in Bosnia?
39% Favor 49% Oppose
How likely is it that airstrikes by U.S. and allied planes would stop the fighting in Bosnia?
50% Very, or somewhat likely 44% Not too, or not at all likely
